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1001 Law
possible by the historical destruction of Jerusalem
(Hom. Jes. Nav. 2; Comm Rom. 6.7). This historical
calamity was divinely superintended, Origen wrote,
and inaugurated the spiritual observation of the
law. Origen admits that a transitional period oc-
curred in the generation after Jesus, when Peter and
Paul observe the old law in some cases: food laws,
circumcision, sacrifices of purification (Acts 21 : 26;
1 Cor 9 : 19–23; Gal 2 : 12). For them, some exces-
sively zealous Jews would not be converted other-
wise. But after the temple’s destruction it was no
longer possible either to offer physical sacrifice or
to celebrate the Passover (Cels. 2.1–2; Hom. Jer.
14.13). It was therefore pointless to argue any
longer with Jews about the law.
Following Philo and Clement, Origen identifies
the essence of the law of Moses with the natural
law. He thinks that Paul repudiates not the law’s
moral content but only the ceremonial law in which
Jews boast (cf. Rom 3 : 27–31). Origen’s interpreta-
tion of Romans stresses the abiding relevance of the
natural law in Paul’s argument, an interpretation
that actualizes the principle that God is the God
not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles. For
all the texts that speak of natural law apply equally
to Gentiles. This means that all humanity is in-
cluded in God’s saving plan, not merely the people
of the circumcision. All will be judged by the law
under which one has been placed. Origen’s Pauline
interpretations exerted a great influence on Jerome
(Comm. Gal., prol. bk. 1).
Bibliography: ■ Bammel, C. P., “Law and Temple in Ori-
gen,” in Templum amicitiae, FS E. Bammel (ed. W. Horbury;
Sheffield 1991) 464–76. ■ Roukema, R., The Diversity of
Laws in Origen’s Commentary on Romans (Amsterdam 1988).
■ Vall, G., Learning Christ: Ignatius of Antioch and the Mystery of
Redemption (Washington, D.C. 2013).
Thomas Scheck
B. Latin Patristics
Western Christian thinkers shared the salvation-
historical perspective on the law that was familiar
to their counterparts in the East, enhanced by coup-
ling with Roman legal traditions. But during the
Pelagian controversy of the early 5th century a fresh
dimension appeared as Augustine elaborated upon
the psycho-spiritual dynamic of the law within the
soul portrayed by Paul in Rom 7.
In terms of salvation history, Westerners re-
ferred to the natural law “written on the heart” of
the Gentiles who, although they do not have the
law of Moses, do the law “by nature” and so become
“a law to themselves” (Rom 2 : 14). The Commentary
on Romans by Ambrosiaster, a lawyer by training,
declares that civilized Romans more closely ob-
served the ethical precepts of the natural law than
did the Jews (Bass: 167). In the context of reasoning
about common laws, Augustine famously wrote, “A
law that is unjust, it seems to me, is no law at all”
(Lib. 1.5.11; quoted by Martin Luther King, “Letter
from Birmingham Jail”).
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Others identified scriptural revelation as “the
law,” literally or by metonymy. The Liber regularum
(ca. 380, Book of rules) of the Donatist Tyconius,
the first Western handbook of biblical interpreta-
tion, and later adapted by Augustine in De doctrina
christiana, aimed to uncover the “mystical rules”
that revealed “the secrets of the law” (Lib. reg., pref-
ace). Donatists accused Catholics of having once sur-
rendered “the law,” i.e., copies of the Scriptures,
to Roman persecutors. The Catholic bishop Optatus
defended the actions by construing “law” narrowly
in terms of its regulative function in favor of the
faith that makes one truly just (Rom 1 : 17). Com-
bining 1 Tim 1 : 9 and Rom 2 : 14, he wrote, “The
law was not given to the just, because every single
just person is a law to himself” (Bass: 168). Optatus
may have sought to turn an argument of the Dona-
tists back on them, since they thought of faith as
putting them beyond law in this sense. Before Au-
gustine turned to examine Gen 1 in bks. 11–13 of
Confessions, he threaded a prayer for enlightenment
with scriptural language about meditating upon
“the wonders of your law” (alluding to Pss 1 : 2;
118[119]:18; and 118[119]:85 [LXX]; Conf. 11.2.2–4).
Most often “the law” referred to the law of Mo-
ses, subdivided between the moral law in the Deca-
logue and the ceremonial law treating matters like
the Sabbath, circumcision, and ritual sacrifice.
Some (e.g., Ambrosiaster, Jerome, Pelagius) thought
of this transcending and having canceled ritual law
as degenerative, the object of Paul’s critiques of the
law in Romans and Galatians. Augustine thought
Paul’s critique referred to the moral law (citing
Rom 7 : 7–11 on the law against coveting; Spir. et
litt. 13.21, see below), and emphasized the ritual
law as prophetic; the literal obedience that its pre-
scriptions enjoined signified hidden anticipations
of Christ within a scheme of prophecy and fulfill-
ment. But now that Christ has come, Augustine
contends, they continue to be authoritative, not to
prescribe behavior, but to bear witness to Christ’s
fulfillment. Christian exegetes now work to unfold
the ancient Jewish ritual commands as confirma-
tions of Christian truth (Faust. 19.13).
Both moral and ritual aspects were bridges in
the salvation-historical unity of OT and NT, an as-
pect of the larger question about Christianity’s rela-
tionship to Judaism. Ambrose of Milan admitted
that Jews remained heirs: “The old law is called a
‘testament,’ and where there is a testament there
is an inheritance” (Ep. 75.3). But like child heirs,
Ambrose wrote, Jews cannot cash in their inherit-
ance; the law remained for them a pedagogue, as
Paul said (Gal 3 : 24). Joining theological judgment
to a knowledge of Roman legal system, Ambrose
assigned to Jews the junior status of pupillus, which
protected children’s inheritance but also prevented
them from enjoying it (Doerfler: 72). During his in-
tense study of Scripture after ordination (ca. 393–
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95), Augustine adopted Paul’s perspective on the
law’s salvation-historical value as a pedagogue to
Christ. He read the common heading of the Psalms
“unto the end,” through the reference to Christ in
Rom 10 : 4 as “the end of the law” (e.g., Enarrat. Ps.
14.1). Augustine mapped the history of humanity
in four phases keyed to the relationship between
law and grace that he discerned in Galatians and
Romans: before the law, under the law, under
grace, in peace (ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia, in
pacem; Div. quest.; 67). The dynamics of humanity’s
transition from sub lege to sub gratia would become
a preoccupation.
“The law” usually referred to the moral dimen-
sion of the covenant embodied above all in the
Decalogue (Exod 20: 1–17; Deut 5 : 6–21). This cor-
nerstone of Israel’s relationship to God was perma-
nently valid for Christians, who remained obligated
to it in toto (Faust. 15.5–8). Augustine’s perspective
on the law and its relationship to grace shifted in
different polemical contexts. Against the Maniche-
ans, who maligned the law of Moses as a pernicious
“law of sin and death,” and acknowledged only
Mani’s “law of the spirit of life” (Rom 8 : 2; Faust.
19.2), Augustine stressed the law’s continuity with
grace. But against the Pelagians, who magnified the
natural goodness of human nature, and saw the law
as a sort of file that God used to smooth the rough
edges of natural human goodness (Pelagius, Ep.
Dem. 8.3), Augustine stressed the law’s powerless-
ness before sin, its antagonism to the gospel, and
its need for grace. Humanity “under law” was char-
acterized by “rampant evil desire” (concupiscence)
coupled with fear of punishment from the law
which, though good in itself, only commands and
does not help (iubet non iuvat; Faust. 15.8).
This theme becomes the subject of a sustained
discussion of law and grace in The Spirit and the Let-
ter, an early (ca. 412), irenic response to Pelagius
that is the focus of the following. The text unfolds
from 2 Cor 3 : 6 (“the letter kills, the Spirit gives
life”; Spir. et litt. 4.6–5.8), which Augustine origi-
nally discovered from Ambrose as an Origenian her-
meneutical axiom stressing continuity between the
two Testaments; it catalyzed his conversion to Ni-
cene Christianity (Conf. 5.14.24; 6.4.6). However,
beginning with the Answer to Simplicianus (ca. 396),
Augustine expanded this reading to contrast the
dynamics within the human heart under law and
under grace (Simpl. 1.17). The Spirit and the Letter
read 2 Cor 3 : 6 in terms of Paul’s account of law,
sin, and grace in Rom 7, the text that most fully
grounded Augustine’s view on the role of biblical
law in salvation. His analysis of the existential dy-
namics of the soul’s transition from law to grace
(e.g., Spir. et litt. 2.4–3.5) were central to the Pela-
gian controversy.
For Augustine, the law reveals a person’s evil
desire (concupiscentia) as essentially the disordered
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love for oneself or things. It uncovers sin’s devastat-
ing force and deep hold on the human heart para-
doxically by making concupiscentia stronger (Spir. et
litt. 4.6). For Augustine, this precipitates a psycho-
spiritual division that externalizes divine law as a
“letter” that kills (2 Cor 3 : 6; Rom 7 : 6). This inner
division occurs because one “knows that the law is
good” (Rom 7 : 16). Because such knowledge can
only come from “the free part of the will,” it both
witnesses to the survival of human free choice even
under sin and seals culpability under the law. But
a death of spirit is incurred by merely literal know-
ledge of the law, despite its divine provenance, for
when the law is acknowledged but not obeyed, it
follows through on its threat. Though intended to
teach wisdom, sin reduces the law to its condemn-
ing function. Knowledge of the law thus increases
responsibility, produces guilt, and provokes pun-
ishment. Of itself, therefore, the law is insufficient
for salvation; to accomplish the good, God must not
only instruct the intellect but also assist the will
(Spir. et litt. 5.7). Knowledge that puffs up must be
infused with love that builds up, which comes not
from law but from grace (1 Cor 8 : 1; Faust. 15.8).
Augustine does not devalue the law but rede-
fines its function and focus. The law is “full of holy
and just precepts” (Spir. et litt. 12.20; cf. Rom 7 : 12).
Moral inadequacy derives not from law itself but
from “the cleverness of the flesh” (prudentia carnis;
Spir. et litt. 17.29). From humanity’s continuous fail-
ure to act on the good that the law requires, the
law discloses the weakness of the human will (ibid.,
9.15) as afflicted with “the disease of evil desire.”
The law cannot cure this illness; rather, its “stimu-
lus by prohibition” makes the illness more severe
(ibid., 6.16), so that “I cannot do the good that I
want” (Rom 7 : 15; Simpl. 1.11). Humanity’s grave
illness derives from Adam’s “original sin,” not from
nature (Simpl. 1.10).
Repeated moral failure makes judgment inevi-
table, thus turning the law of God into an object of
loathing and fear, as seen often in the OT. However,
“fear is deficient as a principle for moral action, be-
cause it does not entirely involve the will in the act”
(Marafioti: 940; Spir. et litt. 32.56). On the other
hand, the law retains its teaching function (Gal
3 : 24 again, but now transposed from Paul’s focus
on Jewish salvation history to internal dynamics of
the sinful soul) by goading one’s desire to seek
mercy from the divine physician. Thus the law
“coaches” souls swollen with pride to embrace hu-
mility by seeking the “medicine” of Christ in the
grace of his death and resurrection (Spir. et litt.
6.10). This “gratuitous grace” (ibid., 13.22) is not
external but given to the heart (ibid., 17.29). Grace
that conjoins Christ’s humility stirs the love that
enables one to overcome evil desire and to act in
accordance with God’s love (Conf. 7.18.24; 20.26).
Law thus serves grace, so that love may fulfill the
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law. “The law is given so that grace may be sought,”
wrote Augustine, “and grace is given so that the law
may be fulfilled” (Spir. et litt. 19.34). Thus “grace
and faith operate in a circular manner” (Marafioti:
941), for grace requested of God and obtained
through faith fulfills the law (Spir. et litt. 30.52;
Simpl. 1.6). “These affirmations summarize the doc-
trinal highpoint of [De spiritu et littera], and synthe-
size Augustine’s thought on law in relation to
grace” (Marafioti: 941).
The grace of the NT thus does not abolish the
moral law of the OT, but offers a way to observe it:
by this “law of faith” (Rom 3 : 27), believers realize
their need for grace to accomplish the good (Spir.
et litt. 10.17). Prayer in faith establishes the right
relationship between law and grace. This is the con-
text for the famous saying of Augustine that so
irked Pelagius (Persev. 20.53), “Grant what you com-
mand, and command what you will” (Conf.
10.28.40; cf. Spir. et litt. 13.22). Prayerful faith takes
up the law in order to complete it in love, in accord
with Paul’s dictum about “faith working through
love” (Gal 5 : 6; Spir. et litt. 14.26). Moral commit-
ment to observe the law with the help of grace en-
ables the expression of love that sets free from “the
body of death” (Rom 7 : 24).
This “law of faith” introduces the interiority of
law from Jer 31 : 31–34 (Spir. et litt. 19.32–33). The
Decalogue’s stone tablets, according to Augustine,
represent the external law as ignored and unob-
served, in contrast to the internal law written on
the heart that is loved and fulfilled (ibid., 17.29–
30). Elsewhere Augustine pairs Rom 13 : 10, on love
fulfilling the law, with 1 Tim 1 : 5, on love as the
“end” of the commandment, to speak of love as
Scripture’s supreme goal, the peak (summa) of its
spiritual teaching on the law (Doctr. chr. 1.35.39).
Jesus taught that “the whole law and prophets”
hang on the commands to love God and neighbor
(Matt 22 : 37–40; Deut 6 : 5; Lev 19 : 18). Coming to
rescue his neighbor in love (dressed as the true
“good Samaritan”; Luke 10 : 29–37), Christ both
humanly fulfilled the law (Catech. 4.8) and for those
incorporated into him made it an instrument of
grace (Faust. 15.8, 17.6, with reference to John
1 : 17; Dulaey). The Holy Spirit pours out love im-
bued with grace (Rom 5 : 5); this kind of love fulfills
the law because it is not extorted through threat or
fear, but freely given. “The law of liberty is the law
of love” (Ep. 167.19; cf. Jas 2 : 8–12). Through the
Spirit, law, grace, faith, and freedom converge to
reveal that “the law of God is love” (Spir. et litt.
17.29).
Bibliography: ■ Augustine of Hippo, De spiritu et littera
(CSEL 60; Vienna 1913) 153–230; ET: The Spirit and the Letter
(WSA I/23; Hyde Park, N.Y. 1997) 133–94. ■ Bass, A. L.,
“Justus sibi lex est: The Donatist Interpretation of the Law
in Romans 2 : 14,” Sacred Scripture and Secular Struggles (ed.
D. Meconi; BAC 9; Leiden 2015) 162–78. ■ Doerfler, M. E.,
“Keeping it in the Family; The law and the Law in Ambrose
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C. Medieval Times and Reformation Era
Church legislation during the patristic era tended
to be reactive and require little discussion: e.g., at
Chalcedon (451) simony and the marriage of dea-
conesses were outlawed (Helmholz 2008: 72). In the
Quinsext Council (692) the Bible seems to have
been replaced by the Apostolic Canons (contained
in ch. 47 of the Apostolic Constitutions) as a clear ex-
pression of Christian law. Unlike in the West,
where Augustine had pointed to Matt 19 : 9 for the
indissolubility of marriage – only separation was al-
lowed, Byzantium followed Justinian’s Novella on
divorce, which was like Roman law strict only pro-
cedurally (Gallagher: 29–34). Leviticus inspired
Western priests to remain celibate, at least the night
before celebrating the Eucharist: for the East this
applied only to monks. Irish canon law in the 6th/
7th centuries drew deeply on the Pentateuch and
provided a fuller treatment of matters of purity and
holiness, for monks, but since there was not much
distance between religious and lay at this point, it
had considerable impact on society.
The Collectio Hibernensis’s 500 biblical passages
were each introduced as “law.” While OT law was
read literally by the Canterbury school of Theodore,
contemporaries on mainland Europe operated a less
rigorous hermeneutic. Gregory the Great wrote con-
cerning incestuous unions that experience had
taught did not produce offspring, following Leviti-
cus “rather than empirical research into patterns of
childbirth (Lev 20 : 21)” (Helmholz 2004: 8). Canon
law evolved into a matter of regulating dispensa-
tions, where exceptions could be tolerated, often
with regard to the NT’s gloss on the OT law. Yet
sometimes the NT (such as the Sermon on the
Mount) expected a higher not a lower level of com-
mitment, with the abolition of permissions, so that
spiritualizing an OT command did not always
lessen its force. The Dionysio-Hadriana collection
(774) attempted to suppress the penitentials and
their inconsistencies (Gallagher: 48).
In Byzantine canon law only exceptionally (the
two Iconoclast Emperors) was biblical law fore-
grounded (Hartmann/Pennington: 132), while in
the West scripture was usually introduced via the
recourse to the authorities of the church fathers.
Around 1170 Balsamon wrote a commentary on
church law that re-emphasized imperial rulings
(Gallagher: 154), with only some of the old remain-
ing valid. Scripture is often a starting point that is
soon left behind (e.g., at PG 137 : 35). Yet in Bolo-
gna Gratian, that great mid-12th-century jurist
whose job it was to collect and arrange the church’s
law after the pattern of civil law, could enlist scrip-
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